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All modern studies of investment decisions and their financing must
build essentially upon Irving Fisher's The Theory of Interest [1pub-
lished more than a third of a century ago. As Kuh [22] has remarked, "the
foundations of capital theory in its modern form have been best articu-
lated [in this work]....Itis a theory at the level of microeconomic
choice and at the level of total market price determination which has the
major ingredients, correctly related to each other, that a capital theory
should have." In this basic model of the capital markets, all the individ-
ual participants' perceptions of their "real" investment opportunities
and their market opportunities to borrow or lend, on the one hand, and
their "initial endowments" of income (or funds) and their personal time
preferences (or utility functions), on the other, mutually interact to
provide Pareto-optimal, stable equilibrium market prices (interest rates).
The theory assumed that "investment opportunities," along with
utility functions and initial endowments, were given; its rigorous analysis
was confined to comparative statics under certainty; and even in this
context, it was at best ambiguous in multiple-period cases with non-
constant interest rates (Hirshleifer [17]). Much work remained to be—
and, happily, has since been—done on the rational derivation of relevant
(real) "investment opportunity functions" from more basic considera-
tions and data; on the dynamics of adjustment processes; and, quite
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recently, on the development of a rigorous analysis of the crucial role
and effects of uncertainty on investment and financing decisions and on
market equilibrium. But a granite cornerstone in the foundations of
future work had been securely put in its place. Subsequent efforts ignore
or disregard Fisher at their peril.
In this paper we undertake to identify the variables required in a
structural equation to explain investment outlays. In section I we assume
that Fisher's perfectly competitive model under certainty is an adequate
theoretical model of investment behavior. We examine the various forms
of accelerator-capacity relationship in the light of certain real-world
complications consistent with certainty of expectations, and point up
additional variables required by Fisher's framework even under the
restrictions involved in the assumption of certainty.
In section II, we examine the modifications required when the Fisher
framework is extended to incorporate the fact of uncertainty. We retain
under uncertainty the assumption that firms are optimizing at all times
by making the decisions that will maximize the market value of their
equity (given the level of "the market" as measured, say, by the
Standard & Poor or Dow-Jones index); and continue to assume that all
securities markets are purely competitive with no frictions or imperfec-
tions whatsoever. Nevertheless, to determine optimal capital outlays in
this rigorous neo-Fisherian model, the fact of uncertainty is shown to
require the inclusion of several financial and risk variables (such as
leverage and retained funds) that would have no place at all if the
world were really characterized by prescience so that the traditional
certainty models would be adequate. The latter part of this section sum-
marizes the author's model of investment and financial policy under
uncertainty. Using the assumption that bonds (as well as stocks) are
risk assets to their owners, we show that investment is inversely related
to leverage—in contrast to the implications of the MM model based on
an assumption that corporate debt is a risidess asset to its owners.
Section III of the paper then specifies a statistical model of investment
outlays based on the foregoing theoretical-economic model; briefly dis-
cusses certain important problems of estimation, and of identification, in
working with data generated under conditions of uncertainty; and pre-
sents the empirical results of applying the model to explain the plant
and equipment expenditures of manufacturing corporations over the
period 195 3-63. Not only are correlations unusually high, but t-ratios
are uniformly good, and forecasts into 1964 are reassuring.Corporation Finance: Risk and Investment 217
1.Analysis Under Certainty
THE ROLE OF ACCELERATOR-CAPACITY VARIABLES
IN THE FISHER MODEL UNDER CERTAINTY
The initial formulation of the accelerator relationship held that net
investment (change.in capital stock) would not only be proportional to
the actual current change in output,
= (1)
but also that its elasticity to capital stock would be unity. Even if we
retain Fisher's classical assumption of certainty for the nonce and also
defer our consideration of all factors impounded in ceteris paribus, it is
clear that reliance on this rigid form of the accelerator involves accept-
ing certain underlying assumptions about the factual situation. In par-
ticular, even with other things equal under certainty, this particular
formulation assumes that (a) production functions are homogeneous of
order one, (b) the existing capital stock of potential buyers of plant
and equipment is at the desired level at the beginning of the period,
(c)suppliers of capital goods (in contrast) have sufficient excess
capacity to meet all demands promptly at existing prices, and (d) the
elasticity of expectations of capital goods buyers is zero.
Some of these restrictive assumptions are more serious than others.
The linear homogeneity of production functions is probably an adequate
approximation for present purposes. Also, lack of excess capacity on
the part of suppliers and long production periods for capital goods
merely serve to introduce a distributed lag of actual investment expendi-
tures trailing the initiating change in outputs. (See Eisner and Strotz
[10].) While this reduces the short-run elasticities, the long-run elas-
ticity of capital to output would still be unity if the other relevant con-
ditions were satisfied. If the elasticity of expectations of capital goods
buyers is greater than zero, the elasticity of capital stocks to output will
generally be increased and a variable measuring growth in output may
need to be added.
If the remaining critical assumption is not accepted, more substantial
modifications are required. It has long been recognized (indeed, since
1917 by J. M. Clark himself) that equation (1) will not hold whenever
the existing capital stocks of the potential buyers of plant and equip-
ment were already in excess of desired levels. An alternative formulation
of the basic "acceleration" approach, free of this defect, substitutes an
assumption that investment will be determined by the discrepancy
between the (known) current capital stock and a desired level which,218 FinancialAspects
in turn, is assumed proportional to (actual or expected) output. A still
more flexible formulation of this "capacity" version of the "acceleration
family" of models introduces a distributed lag of actual investment, after
assuming realistically that only some fraction of an existing discrepancy
between desired and actual capital can be (or wifi be) acquired in any
particular. time interval.This more flexible version of the general
"capacity" variant of the acceleration family of models thus relies on an
equation of the form:
Ig =
yis an adjustment coefficient equal to the fraction of the
"capacity gap" eliminated per period, and B is the fixed (desired)
capital-output ratio.
Still more flexible versions of the accelerator can, of course, be
obtained by dropping the a priori requirement that the capital-output
elasticity coefficient K in equation (1) is unity, and by combining this
more flexible version of the initial accelerator model with its capacity
variant, to specify investment as a function of the level of output, change
in output, and the capital stock at the beginning of the period:
=f(Ot, Ks). (3)
The relation between current output and beginning capital stock may, of
course, be subsumed in some measure of the utilization of capacity
along the lines introduced by de Leeow [4] and others.
OTHER FACTORS REQUIRED EVEN UNDER CERTAINTY
AND PERFECT CAPITAL MARKETS
It is clear that at least the more flexible forms of accelerator relation-
ships form an essential part of any valid theory of investment. They
represent essential determinants of the position—and of the shifts in the
position—of Fisher's investment opportunity function. But quite apart
from considerations introduced by the fact of uncertainty, it is clear that
in the context of Fisher's basic framework, even the most sophisticated
and flexible versions of a generalized "accelerator principle"—such as
equation (3)—would a priori be expected to be an adequate representa-
tion of the true structure of empirical investment behavior only under
severely restrictive ceteris paribus assumptions. If the ceteris of these
accelerator-capacity formulations are not, in fact, paribus to an accept-
able degree of approximation, reliance on these models as an adequate
representation of the structure of investment decision-making behavior
would involve a certain degree of myopia.Corporation Finance: Risk and Investment 219
Many more elements in the economy were allowed—and expected—
to vary in Fisher's model than in even the most flexible version of the
accelerator genus. Fisher's model of the real investment and financial
sectors was (implicitly to be sure) embedded in a general equilibrium
model of the entire economy including factor and product markets.
While the immediately relevant product prices and factor costs were
taken to be exogenously given at any one time, they were determined
by interactions with the rest of the economy and subject to change over
time. Changes in wage rates relative to labor productivity, for instance,
or changes in the efficiency of economic life or other factors affecting
the real cost of physical capital will directly affect the position and
shape of the investment opportunity function, even if all accelerator-
capacity factors were unchanged. Similarly, changes in marginal labor
costs relative to marginal real capital costs per unit of output, by induc-
ing substitutions of capital for labor along a given production function,
will shift the position of the investment opportunity function even under
certainty. If data on these factors have in fact been changing in the real
world over the time period of interest, adherence to Fisher's model
would require that such variables be added to the list of accelerator-
capacity variables in statistical analyses of investment behavior.
Correspondingly, in Fisher's framework—even under conditions of
prescient certainty and blissfully perfect markets throughout—the posi-
tion and shape of the investment opportunity function determine the
amount of investment only in conjunction with the line of "financial
market opportunities." As is well known, the amount of investment is
determined by moving along the (real) investment opportunity function
to the point at which net increments in present value are no longer
positive—in the continuous case, the point of tangency between the real
investment opportunity function and the financial market opportunity
line. Fisher was as sure that a change in the market interest rate—the
relevant "cost of funds" in his model under certainty—would change the
amount of investment without changing the position or shape of the real
investment opportunity function as he was that a change in the latter
would alter the amount of real investment when market opportunity
lines and the rate of interest were unchanged.
To rely on traditional accelerator-type models as complete explana-
tions of real investment behavior would, in the strictest theoretical terms,
be equivalent to relying on one blade of Marshall's famous scissors.
To rely on unaugmented accelerator-type models as an empirically ade-
quate representation of real investment behavior would be to act upon
a presumption that changes in the financial markets, in financial (as220 Financial Aspects
opposed to real) investment opportunities, and in the explicit (or implicit
"opportunity") cost of funds, are uniformly ignored by all business
decision-makers, and thereby to deny the relevance of "the main body
of the maximization principle in economic theory."2 In the specification
of the statistical models fitted in the latter part of this paper, I conse-
quently include variables for the labor and (real) capital costs of output,
for output growth, and for financial costs (interest rates), along with the
levels and change in level of output, capital stock, and capacity utilization.
Our structural equations must include all these variables if they are
to be consistent with the basic Fisher framework of investment decisions
and capital markets. (Whether the effects of all these variables come
through loud and clear in the face of uncertainty and noise in the data
is, of course, an empirical question which we defer to the latter parts of
this paper.) Although our list of variables is already substantially longer
than called for by accelerator-capacity models, it should be emphasized
that up to this point our analysis has been conducted entirely within
Fisher's own assumptions of perfect certainty and perfectly competitive
market structures. For this reason, it will be noted, we have as yet not
introduced, certain other variables often included in investment equations
—notably, current (or lagged) dollar profits or retained funds, current
(or lagged) profit rates, initial endowments of funds, or assets. Within
Fisher's idealized world of perfect competition and certainty, these
factors affect the amounts of borrowing and lending and thereby the
level of interest rated; but, given the level of interest rates, they do not
affect the amount of investment, and with certainty none of them would
affect the expectations of future profitability on incremental real invest-
ments incorporated in the investment opportunity function.
Before turning to the effects of uncertainty, there is one further real-
world factor which must be considered briefly. Fisher did not develop
the effects of corporate taxes upon optimal investment criteria, but the
existence of a moderu corporate tax structure is perfectly consistent
with standard assumptions of certainty. Jorgenson's3 recent work has
elegantly filled in this gap in the theory. By maximizing net worth sub-
ject to a general neoclassical production function and the constraint
that the growth in capital stock is investment less replacement, he shows
[19] that the marginal productivity of capital is equal to the ratio of the
useE cost of capital to the price of output, where the user cost in turn is
proportional to the cost price of capital goods. The factor of propor-
tionality is a weighted sum of the depreciation rate and the market
2 The slightly ungrammatical phrase is taken from Eisner [9], p. 139,Corporation Finance: Risk and Investment 221
interest rate. Both weights involve the corporate tax rate. The other
factor in the depreciation term is the proportion of replacement charge-
able against income for tax purposes, and the other factor affecting the
impact of the interest rate is the proportion of interest charges in total
financial costs. Because of the latter term, leverage would affect optimal
investment decisions, even in a world of certainty whenever there was
a modern corporate income tax and, because of the favored treatment
of the interest expense in such a tax, both the optimal capital stock
and the level of current investment would vary directly with leverage.3
The Jorgenson marginal productivity of capital term, involving the
appropriate combination of tax, interest and depreciation rates, and
leverage, is included in our later statistical analysis.
ii. Analysis Under Uncertainty
THE FORMATIONS OF EXPECTATIONS:
MODIFICATIONS AND ADDiTIONAL FACTORS
SUGGESTED BY THE FACT OF UNCERTAINTY
All the factors which would affect investment decisions under idealized
conditions of certainty obviously must be included in the structural
specification of investment behavior under uncertainty. The variables
representing these factors may or may not be different under uncer-
tainty: such items as beginning-of-period capital stock or interest rates
can be introduced as known data; the variables representing other such
crucially important elements as outputs may need to be modified or
supplemented because itisthe uncertain expectations of the future
output levels (and associated operating costs) that determine the expec-
tations of future profitability which directly affect current investment
decisions.
Unfortunately, we have relatively little firm knowledge of the way
such expectations of uncertain future outcomes are formed. Presumably
they reflect some amalgam of past experience adjusted by new informa-
tion. As an empirical matter, it has become common to assume (follow-
ing the lead of Friedman [13]) that these judgments of the relevant
future magnitudes reflect current judgments of "permanent" or "true"
output levels, which are free of the random or transient components in
the unfiltered and unadjusted raw data on current outputs. In this
As shown in [19], p. 249, the optimal capital stock, given output and sales
prices, is inversely proportional to the user cost, which in turn varies inversely with
leverage, ceteris paribus. Jorgenson's cost variable is described in more detail in
footnote 33 below.222 Financial Aspects
approach, it is generally considered reasonable to believe that, at least
to a first-order approximation, these current estimates of "sustainable"
outputs are formed in terms of a simple "learning" theory that reduces
arithmetically to an exponential smoothing (or some similar weighted
average) of past observed data on outputs. It may be noted, however,
that this approach presumes that decisions are made on the basis of
"point estimates" of future data, whereas all the modern neo-Bayesian
economic-statistical theory of rational decision-making under uncertainty
argues the relevance and importance of the entire probability distribution
except in special cases. Since it is very unlikely that corporations (or
their shareholders!) are "linear in money" with respect to their capital
budgets and since relevant "loss functions" are surely not symmetrical,
nor quadratic utilities adequate to reflect preferences [27, P. 18] and
[35],it seems clear that some variable measuring risk or degree of
uncertainty may well be required along with measures of expected values.
It might have been argued that, even in a world of certainty, the
level of orders and of order-backlogs would be as useful a measure
(particularly in durable goods industries) as current output levels in
judging future sales. When uncertainty is admitted into the analysis,
their a priori relevance is greatly strengthened, for these are current data
which bear directly on the future. Moreover, changes and trends in the
level of orders and order-backlogs can probably be expected to have
as much or more expectational significance as changes and trends in
outputs; and, as Hart [15] has recently proposed, the level of the ratio
of orders to capacity may play an even more critical role in the forma-
tion of the expectations which determine investment decisions.
The presence of uncertainty also suggests the need for still other vari-
ablesto measure the expectations that are relevant to investment
decisions. In a maximizing world, investment decisions depend upon
estimates of future profitability, which in turn depend upon operat-
ing costs and sales prices as well as output levels. In a world of
certainty, future data on each would be known. Judgments of each
are required in the real world of uncertainty. The current levels of (and
recent changes and trends in) the ratio of product prices to unit labor
costs, and in the ratio of product prices to the costs of real capital, thus
properly belong in the specification of determinants of investment out-
lays. Alternatively, current levels, changes, and trends in profit margins
mayused. As in the case of the judgment of future output levels,
there are important empirical questions regarding the way in which these
expectations are formed and how much effect they have in practice.Corporation Finance: Risk and Investment 223
Nevertheless, the expectations of future profit margins are, in principle,
relevant on a par with expectations of output levels.
THE IMPACT OF FINANCE AND LIQUIDITY ON
INVESTMENT OUTLAYS UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Up to this point—except for the brief comment on the possible rele-
vance of a risk or dispersion variable in output and margin expectations
—our discussion of the effects of uncertainty has pointed up the prob-
able need for different or additional variables to capture the future
expectations relevant to investment decisions under uncertainty. These
modifications or additions were all required to capture under uncer-
tainty the expectations that managements hold with respect to the
specific determining variables which we saw would determine investment
decisions if the future were known exactly in advance. With the excep-
tions noted, the modifications and additions have related to the same
list of determining factors that would be operative under certainty.
The changes and additions required in the finance sector of the model by
the fact of uncertainty are much more fundamental. Under certainty, only
the risk-free interest rate (adjusted for corporate taxes, if any) and the
"tax shield" of depreciation allowances would be relevant to investment
decisions. Current profits, dividends, retained funds, current assets or
liabilities, funded debt, and net worth would—in strict theory—all be
completely irrelevant. But once uncertainty—and certain other facts of
life which would be of no consequence were it not for the fact of uncer-
tainty—are admitted into the analysis, the situation is basically altered.
Suppose, for the moment, that there were no taxes and financial
markets were really such that the Modigliani-Miller fundamental propo-
sitiOn [31], [32], and [33] was valid. The aggregate market value of all
the securities (stocks and bonds combined) issued by any corporation
would be independent of its debt-equity ratio or, more generally, of the
mixture of claims upon its cash flows. This aggregate market value in
turn would depend upon both the expected value and the risks associated
with the corporations' cash flows (before interest charges), and upon
expectations of their future growth as a result of further investment
outlays. In this simplified world without taxes, the minimum marginal
expected return required to justify new investment (the company's "cost
of capital") would be independent of its existing capital structure and of
the mix of fund sources utilized to finance its current (or future) capi-
tal budgets, but, even so, it would depend upon risk as well as upon the
pure interest rate.224 Financial Aspects
The introduction of corporate taxes in this model, of course, makes
the relevant cost of capital depend upon tax rates and leverage as well. But
in this framework, with corporate debt assumed to be riskiess, corporate
taxes make the market value of the corporate entity a necessarily
increasing function of the degree of leverage. Rather remarkably, there-
fore, within the MM model addressed to an uncertain world, the rele-
vant cost of capital is inferred to be a declining function of the degree
of leverage,4 just as it is implicitly in Jorgenson's model derived without
introducing uncertainty. Within the MM framework, the more leverage
a company has, the further down its marginal efficiency of capital sched-
ule it can profitably and properly move—i.e., the larger the fraction of
the projects submitted to its capital budgeting committee which should
be approved.5 This MM model thus predicts a positive association
between leverage and investment outlays under uncertainty, just as
under certainty. This prediction is, of course, contrary to what many
of us have observed in the field interviewing and working with corporate
financial officers; it also does not accord with some recent statistical
evidence [36]. The proposition is further tested later in this paper.
This surprising prediction, of course, follows logically from the rather
severe assumptions of the MM model. But if, instead, one accepts the
assumption made in my own work that corporate bonds as well as
corporate stocks are risky assets to their owners and if, in particular, it is
recognized and consequently assumed that, for any given stochastic
EB][T stream, an increasein fixed financial charges exponentially
increases the probability of default and risks of loss on forced refinanc-
ing, thereby reducing expected returns by more than the mere interest
charge on the added debt—then the troublesome inferences of the MM
model no longer follow in strict theory under uncertainty, even within
purely competitive markets with no imperfection whatsoever.
In my own theoretical work, I have assumed that all risk assets are
traded in a single purely competitive capital market in which all investors
are risk-averters with explicit joint (Gaussian or log-Gaussian) prob-
ability distributions over the end-of-period outcomes of the n risk-assets
in the market. By introducing these additional assumptions into Fisher's
model of capital market equilibrium under certainty, the equilibrium
vector of market values of all risk-assets are simultaneously determined.
(See Lintner [27] and [28].) Within this Fisherian model adopted to
Note from equation (8) in [33], p. 442, that the required return net of tax
declines linearly with leverage.
Presumably institutional restrictions take over before leverage approaches 100
per cent, but the model is silent on how or where.Corporation Finance: Risk and Investment 225
uncertainty, I then regard the jthcompany'sbonds and its stock as dif-
ferent risk assets (each with its own vector of attributes) being traded
in the perfectly fluid and purely competitive market of all stocks and
bonds. I allow for the fact that the risks of holding corporate bonds
and stocks (even of the same company) differ substantially because they
have different variances and because their returns are subject (to at
least a significant degree) to different influences, including different
intercorrelations with other risk assets and with different exogenous
variables.
In this Fisher framework adapted to uncertainty, the market values
of the jthcompany'sbonds and of its stock will each reflect its own
vector of attributes (including its own row or column of the master
variance-covariance matrix). In particular, the differential effect on the
market value of a company's common stock of a given action by the
company is not determined by first finding its differential effect upon the
aggregated "entity" value of the company and then merely subtracting
bond values (as for MM), but rather is determined directly as its effect
on the common stock itself. (Any action by a company, of course,
affects both the market value of its bonds and of its equity in the corn-
petitive equilibrium, but the effect of the action shareholder's welfare is
measured directly by the latter.)
Within this model (even with the vector of all future investment out-
lays and "earnings" invariant), maximization of equity value occurs
with positive leverage (except in limiting cases of a priori low rele-
vance) and the degree of optimal leverage is a unique function of the
set of parameter values pertaining to any given case. Apart from the
effects of taxes, the minimum marginal expectation of return on new
real investment which will justify the issuance of debt for (some or all
of) its financing—the marginal "cost of debt capital"—is a continuously
rising function of the amount of debt or the degree of leverage. (This is
true even in the simpler versions of the model in which the interest is
not assumed to be a rising function of leverage. The introduction of
rising interest costs merely compounds the effect.) This result reflects
both the marginal effect of leverage on the expectations of earnings
before interest charges noted above, as well as its more commonly
recognized impact on variances of rates of returns.6 Both these con-
siderations are directly attributable to the fact of uncertainty as such,
and both are cumulative in their effect (i.e., both have positive second
derivatives with leverage). In contrast, the favorable treatment accorded
6Fora more precise statement, see also item (d) on p. 227 below.226 Financial Aspects
interest expense in the tax laws—a factor common to the certainty case
and our model under uncertainty—provides at most a linear offset. In
the presence of a modern corporate tax structure, the marginal cost of
debt capital under uncertainty must consequently be an orthodox
U-shaped function, rising beyond some moderate amount of leverage.
(This is true, incidentally, in both the short and long run.)
It follows immediately that, given any dividend or retention policy,
there is an optimal degree of leverage. I have shown elsewhere [25]
that, in the Fisher model of capital markets adapted to uncertainty,
there is an optimal dividend payout policy,7 given probabilistic invest-
ment opportunities (and any given level of leverage). A fortiori, there
is an optimal mix of retentions and leverage for each company in the
market.
In finding what this optimum is under any given set of expectations,
the firm is assumed to act in accordance with standard maximizing
principles: at any point along the "expansion path" of standard pro-
duction theory (i.e., as the tentative size of the firm's capital budget is
increased),it equates the marginal (not the average8) cost of each
source, retentions and debt. If the firm is at a point on its "funds-for-
investment-outlays" production function which is not on the "expansion
path," these marginal costs in turn get equated by its using the cheaper
source until it is no longer cheaper. Now for any given retention ratio,
the marginal costs of debt are U-shaped when plotted against leverage
(as noted above); but an optimizing firm will always be operating on
the rising, right-hand side of this curve. The reason is simply that the
marginal costs of retention are themselves a continuously rising func-
tion of the degree of leverage with which the retentions are associated.
Since the maximizing firm uses debt instead of retentions as long as debt
is cheaper, it will continue to use debt until marginal debt costs have
become as large as marginal retention costs.
It must also be noted that these marginal debt costs are necessarily
larger than the yield on the outstanding debt for four compounding
In this paper for simplicity, I am confining the analysis to the joint optimiza-
tion of dividends-retentions policy, debt, and real investment. (See also footnote 18.)
It should be noted, however, that there will also be an optimal dividends-retention
policy vis a vis common stock financing as a result of differentials in tax rates on
ordinary income and capital gains (as pointed out in both Modigliani a.nd Miller
[32] and Lintner [24]) if investor's incomes differ, even if their probability distri-
butions are identical and there are no issue or transfer costs.Relaxing the latter
assumptions also introduces definite investor preferences for dividend policy even
in the absence of taxes (see Lintner [2411).
8Theaverage is acceptable if and only if it is equal to the marginal cost.Corporation Finance: Risk and Investment 227
reasons.9 The yield on outstanding debt is in the nature of an average
return to the bond owner; the relevant costs to the company and its
shareholders are higher1° because: (a) issue costs are often relatively
substantial compared with buyer yields at the time of issue; (b) increas-
ing leverage, other things being equal, increases lender's risks, which
results (even in purely competitive markets with no imperfections) in
interest rates that are an increasing function of borrower's leverage and
which makes the relevant marginal cash flow costs to the borrower
higher than the stated interest charge on the immediate increment of
debt (this difference between the relevant marginal and the average
interest cost is itself a rapidly increasing function of leverage); (c) as
noted earlier, for any given stochastic EBIT stream, an increase in fixed
financial charges exponentially increases the risks of default and risks
of loss to the company and its shareholders on forced refinancings,
thereby reducing expected returns by more than even the relevant issue
and marginal interest charges on the added debt; and, finally,(d)
increasing leverage increases the variance of the distribution of the
present values11 of the relevant cash flows (associated with any given
stochastic EBIT stream which reflects a given vector of investments)
which crucially affect the current market values of equities in a purely
See footnote 12.
10 Because of the prevalence (among economists and elsewhere) of the belief
that a "weighted average cost of capital" rule is appropriate under uncertainty, we
should note that the "weighted average cost of capital" is usually a weighted average
of the earnings yield on the stock and the market yield (or coupon rate) on debt
(using equity and debt as weights). In terms of our model, this weighted average
alternative is too low because (1) the relevant debt cost is necessarily (and usually
very much) greater than the average debt yield used in the weighted average for-
mula, and (2) the cost of retentions or new issues for equity is also higher than
the earnings yield whenever we allow for the facts that the future is uncertain,
that we know still less about the more distant future, and that most investors are
"risk averters."(See Lintner [25].)In sum, the weighted average cost usually
used is too low because, in the face of the uncertainties of life, it understates the
required returns for the use of equity capital, and it doubly understates the mar-
ginal expected returns which must be required to justify the use of debt. Moreover,
these understatements are mutually reinforcing in the sense that the greater the
"spread" on the equity side (i.e., the difference between the marginal rates which
are really required to justify the use of equity and the current earnings yield of the
stock), the greater will be the corresponding spread (above marginal cash costs on
a yield basis) on the debt, and vice versa.
11 Alternatively, and in more traditional language, we find that increased leverage
increases the variance of profit rates, and a fortiori the variances of prospective
growth rates.(Stock prices were shown to be inversely related to the variance of
growth rates in Lintner [25].)Themarginal prospective return on new investment
financed with debt must be enough higher than the combined costs of (a), (b)
and (c) above to offset this further variance effect on stock values.228 Financial Aspects
competitive capital market. (See Lintner [27].) The third and fourth
factors together determine the relevant risk premium involved in debt
financing in excess of issue costs and its relevant marginal cash costs.'2
The maximizing firm will increase the size of its capital budget until
the marginal expected return no longer exceeds the marginal cost of
capital along its expansion path—i.e., the equalized marginal costs of
debt. and of retentions. Under uncertainty, this optimal intersection
of "m.e.c." and "m.c.c." will occur where the marginal cost curve is
rising with increased budget size. It follows that the marginal cost of
added retentions and of added leverage are not only equal but rising
at the equilibrium point.13
Finally, a distinction between long-run and short-run equilibrium is
required. So far in my discussion of the derivations of the costs of capi-
tal and the optimal finance mix, I have implicitly been discussing the
analogue under uncertainty of the "long-run equilibrium" analysis of the
traditional "comparative statics (or dynamics)" under certainty. I firmly
believe—and always have14—that (target) dividend payout ratios (or
retention rates), target or ex ante maximal debt-equity ratios, and
capital budgeting criteria in the long-run planning context are mutually
determined. Other things being given, relatively greater volumes of
more promising and profitable investment opportunities on the average
(or expected over the long pull) lead to greater retentions (lower
dividend payouts) and greater leverage; while expected values pertaining
to investments being the same, greater "business risks" or ex ante vari-
ances in average and marginal EBIT streams lead to lower retentions
(higher cash dividend payouts) and lower leverage. In this way, ceteris
pan bus, the target dividend payout ratio and the ex ante expected aver-
age (or cx ante maximal) debt ratios are mutually determined along
with the "cost of capital" (used to determine the optimal ex ante size
of capital budgets) in terms of long-run expectations (in the econo-
mist's sense) •15 These long-run expectations, in turn, involve judgments
12 It should be noted that the sizes of (c) and (d) are increasing functions of
factors (a) and (b); (c) and (d) themselves are additive; and (b) will also be an
increasing function of the combined effect of (c) and (d).
13 For the no leverage case, see Models Il—VI in Lintner [25].Thesame con-
clusion that the marginal cost of retentions is necessarily rising at the optimum,
of course, holds as well for any given degree of leverage. The costs of leverage are
also rising at the optimum, since they are rising throughout the relevant range,
ceteris paribus.
14 See my [23) and t26].
15 Liquidity considerations may also be included in this simultaneous long-run
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of the company's investment opportunity functions and the operating
characteristics of the business, along with the characteristics of competi-
tive reactions in the firm's product and factor markets and the other
properties of the stochastic processes within which it lives.
In terms of shorter-run equilibria, however, the situation is basically
different in one important respect. Although the target dividend payout
ratios (as well as the debt-equity ratios and criteria for determining
the size of the capital budget) are simultaneously determined in the
theoretical context of a comparative dynamic, stochastic, long-run equi-
librium analysis, along with somewhat more flexible "speed-of-adjust-
ment" coefficients16(to control the response of cash dividends to
cyclical and stochastic changes in earnings), cash dividend payments in
line with these predetermined standards constitute a top priority claim
on funds during short-run fluctuations. Given the fact of substantial
uncertainty, the assumption that companies are seeking to maximize the
value of their equity, the crucial dependence of market values on share-
holders expectations, and the extraordinarily high "information content"
of changes in dividend payments in the eyes of shareholders as they
form their expectations—such action by companies is perfectly rational
(i.e., maximizing behavior under uncertainty) in terms of strict theory.
Thereisalso substantial evidence that thistheoretical formulation
describes actual practice with respect to dividend payments very well.17
In our theoretical model, consequently, short-run optimization occurs
subject to the constraint of dividend outflows at each point in time in
accordance with the established dividend policy (except for infrequent
16Thesestandards for speed-of-adjustment factors within each company are
established in a similar manner on the basis of the mutual interrelationships
expected between the volume of profitable investment opportunities and other parts
of the sources and uses of funds flows over the cycle. For a fuller discussion of
dividend determination, see Lintner [23] and [26].It should be emphasized that
the theoretical (and practical) conclusions drawn in the text here depend only on
company's adherencetoan established dividend policy; they do not depend upon
the ultimate resolution of any differences there may be on whether the policy itself
is denominated in terms of reported "earnings" or cash flows, for instance, as
Brittain [3] has concluded.
See, for instance, the three references in the preceding footnote. Important
additional confirmation is provided by Glauber [14].In a canonical correlation
analysis of all sources and uses of funds of forty-four chemical companies in three
postwar years of extreme expansions and three years of contraction, he found that
the dividend earnings relationship was uniformly the first and dominant factor in
the analysis; it was also the most stable.Subject to this orthogonal factor, the
residuals revealed a complex interaction among working capital, real investment,
and liquidity decisions.230 Financial Aspects
crisis situations requiring immediate re-examination of the company's
entire set of long-run expectations and policies). As in the traditional
short-run theory of the firm (in which price and volume decisions are
taken subject to the constraint of a fixed stock of real capital), our
model of short-run adjustments assumes that firms simultaneously adjust
and optimize over time the volume of their real investment, the amount
(and forms) of their outside financing (if any), and their working
capital and liquidity positions, all subject to predetermined requirements
for dividend payments.
In this short-run context (quarter to quarter or year to year), the
cost-of-funds factor in investment decisions works out as follows. The
cost of the debt used will clearly be equal to its marginal costs, which
in the relevant range, it will be recalled, rises with the degree of leverage
in an essentially exponential manner, due not only to the rising marginal
explicit cash costs of debt but even more to the rapidly increasing addi-
tional risk premiums required because of the greater "borrower's risk"
being borne as leverage increases. Further, the opportunity cost of using
some more retained funds to increase the current size of the capital
budget is the foregone opportunity to repay debt, as Duesenberry [6]
has emphasized. The cost of retained funds for investment is thus also
given by the marginal cost-of-debt function. The cost of using either debt
or retained funds to finance investments is thus higher than the quoted
interest rate by amounts that increase rapidly with leverage.18
Note particularly that this cost of using either debt or retained funds
to finance investment wifi, other things being the same, vary inversely
with the amount of retained funds.19 For any given level of investment
outlay, the availability of more retained funds enables the firm to have
less debt outstanding at the end of the period. Alternatively, we can say
that more retained funds permit the financing of a given level of invest-
18 Space does not permit any detailed discussion of the place of common stock
financing in the model. Suffice it to say that such issues will be made only at such
times as the (essentially long-term) standards of acceptable debt and liquidity
positions are being strained by current (and prospective) profitable investment out-
lays andwhenmarket conditions are sufficiently favorable to bring the full costs
of a new equity issue down to or below the costs of other funds (or of foregone
investment). With the principal exceptions of utilities and small, rapidly growing,
ambitious firms, such conditions apparently occur infrequently, and we will simply
assume here that the costs of equity are equal to or greater than the cost of debt.
19 Note also that, given dividend policy, the relevant cost of funds in the short
run also varies inversely with the amount of dollar profits. See following comment
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mentat lower marginal costs than would otherwise be possible.2° It also
followsthat, for any given size (or schedule) of marginal costs of debt
capital, the optimal scale of investment outlays will be an increasing
function of the amount of retained funds currently available.21
Given uncertainty and risk aversion on the part of shareholders, this
conclusion that, other things being equal, the availability of greater
retained funds should increase the real investment outlays of optimizing
decision-makers is rigorously implied by the theoretical model. This is
true without introducing tax considerations or .any imperfections what-
soever (not even transactions costs), and it is true under uncertainty
cum risk aversion even though the result is foreign to classical doctrine
based on the traditional assumption of prescience. Uncertainty and risk
aversion do make a big difference, in theory as well as in practice!22
Not only are profits and flow variables (which would be irrelevant
under certainty) required as legitimate and essential elements in the
neo-Fisherian theory of the structural determinants of optimal invest-
ment outlays under uncertainty; but entirely new content and values are
introduced into the relevant "interest rate" variables.
20 The value to the firm of the availability of some finite increment of retained
funds is thus greater than indicated by the marginal cost of currently outstanding
debt. For it is equal to the (integral of the) marginal costs of the larger amount
of debt that would have been outstanding had the marginal retained earnings not
been available, and the relevant debt cost function is highly concave upward for
reasons already given.
To avoid misunderstanding, the reader should keep in mind that we are here in
a short-run context—the values involved are the shadow prices of existing supplies
of retained earnings; except within the limits of flexibility in "speed-of-adjustment"
factors in dividend policy (this flexibility in practice is largely confined to "round-
ing up" or "rounding down" to even nickels or dimes in per-share dividends) we
are not referring to adjustments in the amounts of. retained earnings available.
21 analysis has ignored issue costs, which make the marginal costs of
increases in debt greater than those marginal savings of reductions in debt. The
analysis has also assumed that managements' judgments and reactions are symmet-
rical with respect to the effects of increases or decreases in current debt levels on.
future borrowing costs and "safety margins" or "flexibility." The effect of all such
considerations would be to make the favorable marginal effect of retained funds on
investment outlays greater when they were short of capital requirements than when
they were in excess of the volume of otherwise profitable investments.
22 In the same connection, the reader will recall earlier conclusions regarding
the effects of leverage. The presence of uncertainty involves cumulatively rising
costs which convert the linearly declining marginal cost of debt function (found
with taxes under certainty) into a U-shaped curve; and optimizing firms will neces-
sarily operate on the rising portion of the curve.232 Financial Aspects
111.StatisticalAnalysis
In this section we present the results of a statistical analysis of the
determinants of the plant and equipment outlays of all U.S. manufactur-
ing companies over the forty-four quarters in 1953—63. The analysis,
incorporating accelerator, financial, and risk variables, is based directly
on the theory developed in the previous section. All financial data used
were drawn from the F.T.C.-S.E.C. Quarterly Financial Reports, ex-
cept that interest rates were taken from the Federal Reserve Bulletin
and Standard and Poor's data on stock prices and seasonally adjusted
earnings were used. Hickman's careful estimates [16] of constant dollar
capital stocks and quarterly interpolations of his annual estimates of
declining-balance depreciation rates provided the data for these series.
Output was measured by the Federal Reserve Board index of manufac-
turing production, and capacity utilization by de Leeuw's index. Hart
kindly made his data on the orders-to-capacity ratio available, and these
were supplemented with O.B.E. data on backlogs. The series on labor
cost per unit of output was taken from the Bureau of the Census
Business Cycle Developments.
Several essentially statistical problems must be considered before we
specify the particular models fitted and present the results. The first
problem arises from the fact that investment decisions taken at any
point in time—on the basis of the expectations as of that point in time
and hence upon current and past data then available—result in expendi-
tures over a succession of future periods. From the work of Koyck [21],
Solow [36] and Jorgenson [19], we know that, in principle, the form
of this distributed lag can be determined by including one or two lagged
values of the dependent variable as explanatory variables in the equa-
tion being fitted. But given the character of the experiments which have
been run for us in the real world and the available collinear data, these
procedures run the serious risk that the autoregressive properties of the
dependent variable itself will swamp the effects of other explanatory
variables.lEn this event—even though very high R2's, good Durbin-
Watson (D.W.) ratios, and low standard errors of estimate are obtained
as a matter of course—the estimates obtained are essentially those of a
pure autoregressive model,23 and the parameter values for the other
variables of more theoretical interest can be quite unstable and mis-
leading. lEn particular, if by chance the estimates obtained for the auto-
23Asan illustration, see comments of Jorgenson in [201, commenting on his own
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regressive terms differ from their true values, the estimates for the struc-
tural decision variables will almost inevitably be biased. Fortunately,
other alternatives are available.24 The one utilized in the work reported
here was the use of the independent estimates of the lag structure of
manufacturers' investment outlays behind their appropriations developed
in Almon's recent study [11.25Useof these exogenous estimates of the
relevant lag structure enables us to confine the list of explanatory vari-
ables in our equations to those representing the determinants of invest-
ment decisions, and thereby to avoid the ambiguities and risks involved
in the use of lagged investment terms.
A somewhat similar problem is imposed by the common time' trends
in much of the data. Apart from the use of cross sections with which
we are not now concerned, one quite effective device for handling this
problem—much used in consumption studies following the pioneering
work of Duesenberry [5] and Modigliani [30]—is, of course, to fit the
model to the data in ratio form. This precedure was also followed in this
paper. Specifically, investment outlays in real terms and all explanatory
variables (not already in ratio form or having the dimensions of interest
rates) were deflated by beginning-of-period capital stock.
The fact that the Almon weights represent the time pattern between
appropriations and the subsequent expenditures on investment goods
raises another troublesome issue.26 Clearly, the first period in Almon's
lags dated from appropriations may not be the quarter in which the
decision was taken, nor is it necessarily even the immediately following
24 See, for instance, Eisner [7] and de Leeuw [4]. The Eisner approach requires
the use of large numbers of lags for each relevant explanatory variable; even when
put in first difference form to reduce collinearities, the latter problem remains and
the large number of lags in the explanatory variables rules out the approach as a
practical matter in fitting the theory advanced in this paper. De Leeuw's approach
of testing various previously defined weight patterns is directly used in this study,
employing the Almon weights which were developed after de Leeuw's work.
25Thesehave also been used by Resek in [36].
26 There is clearly much to be said in favor of undertaking two separate studies,
one to establish the set of factors which together determine investment decisions
and their associated appropriations, the other to establish the structure and param-
eter values of the realization function relating the appropriated inputs (together
with subsequent information and "surprises") to the later expenditures.Such
research should surely be encouraged.It seemed, however, that the essential pur-
poses of the present investigation could best be served by following the more usual
practice of relating the theoretical model of decisions-to-invest directly to the
resulting spending on investment goods.Within the restricted compass of the
empirical work reported here, this was the primary tack taken. In the final stages
of our work, however, some additional runs were made including measures of the
current quarter's conditions, which we hoped would pick up cancellations and other
effects of "surprises."234 Financial Aspects
one. There are lags between decisions and appropriations, just as there
are between the latter and actual spending. As in Anderson's earlier
work [2], the appropriate time span between the conditions initiating
decisions and the first period of spending was estimated empirically.
Specifically, for the jthperiodof weighted-summed explanatory vari-
ables, the denominator of the dependent variable was beginning-of-year
real capital stock, but differently dated numerators were tried. The
dependent variable with i1 proved to be consistently superior
to no lead (i =0)or to a two- or three-period lead.
Another problem is reflected in the fact that all the initial "fits" to
the data left unacceptably low Durbin-Watson statistics, generally in
the range .4—.6. Much of this autocorrelation doubtless arises from the
fact that Almon's best lag distribution for all manufacturing showed a
D.W. statistic of only about .9 when investment outlays were predicted
from appropriations. Further autocorrelation is introduced by our own
treatment of the data. Our use of data with a given quarter's time index27
(as inputs into the Almon-weighted sums which are our explanatory
variables) in effect assumes that these particular input data control the
investment decisions made within the quarter. In point of fact, of course
—as Hart [15] has aptly said—"deciding to invest is a process rather
than an event." Consequently, it can be argued that the inputs into the
Almon lags should themselves be moving averages rather than data for
a single quarter. Our use of the latter inputs then involves using data
with a form of autocorrelated "observational error."
Although autocorrelated residuals, as such, do not bias parameter
estimates, they do reduce their efficiency. The use of lagged values of
the dependent variable was ruled out for reasons given above.28 But
the device recommended by Johnston [18] and Theil [39] to reduce
autocorrelations and improve estimating efficiency was employed—all
variables, dependent and independent, were converted to the form
— Theresiduals on the first pass suggested an r of .8,
which led to a substantial improvement. Successive recalculations using
r values from .4 through 1.0 indicated, however, that the optimum value
27 This does not, of course, mean that only dataforthe given quarter were used
as inputs. For instance, the inputs into the Almon weights for, say, the second
quarter of 1956 include the capacity utilization ratio, retained funds and leverage
of that quarter, along with first differences as of that quarter, and lagged (i.e.,
beginning-of-quarter)interest rates, and so on.Also, exponentially smoothed
values or trend values as of a given quarter were tested for some variables.
28 We should perhaps also note that use of the new unbiased estimating tech-
nique developed by Taylor and Wilson [381 was ruled out by the fact that the
lagged dependent variable does not enter our model as an explanatory variable in
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for r was .9, and this value was used in preparing the final estimates
since it minimized both the standard error of estimate and the remaining
autocorrelation, and did so consistently for the various equations pre-
sented below.
Finally, we have to recognize the fact that in a world of uncertainty,
asnotedearlier,rationalinvestmentdecisions depend upon the
expectations (in the sense of economists) of future profitability, rather
than upon known data on nonrandom outcomes. And there is as yet
very little firm knowledge of how these expectations are generated.
Along with the current capital stock and real costs, the theoretical
economic model tells us that expectations of such items as future out-
puts and profit margins are basic determinants of the position of the
firm's real investment opportunity function; but economic theory does
not tell us precisely what available numbers (reflecting current situations
and past experience) are processed in precisely what ways to produce
the inherently unobservable judgments regarding these theoretically
relevant future magnitudes. Similarly, the theoretical economic model
tells us that, in addition, financial and risk elements are required to
determine the optimal point on the expected real investment opportunity
function. It goes as far as to require the inclusion of interest rates,
retained funds, and leverage (as a risk as well as a financial cost vari-
able); but it does not tell us in advance, for instance, what particular
form of the leverage variable will best measure the essentially subjective
risk content of the variable. In the circumstances, one must experiment
with real world series to see which ones (on standard statistical-econo-
metric tests) perform best as empirical counterparts or representations
of the theoretically required decision elements.29
Previous studies have established the great if not dominant role of
capacity-accelerator considerations in empirical investment behavior,30
although it is not which form of the relationship is most
significant and reliable. In view of the special focus of the present paper
on the theoretical and empirical significance of long-term finance and
risk considerations in investment decisions, we consequently structured
our empirical work in the following way. Along with each of several
29Inpart, this is because the economic theory per se takes the primary prob-
ability judgments (like von Neumann-Morgenstein utility functions or the classical
preference functions) as givens, and merely derives optimal decision rules from
these; in part, itis because the formation of these basic expectations doubtless
involves personal and social psychological factors along with strictly economic
considerations.
3°SeeKuh's fine summary [22],especially pp. 264—267, and Meyer and
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standard (and some new) accelerator or capacity variables, interest
rates and their smoothed first difference, as well as leverage (with and
without allowance for retained funds), were added in different forms
and combinations to the equations to be fitted. The resulting estimates of
parameters and summary statistics were then examined to determine
whether the finance and risk variables were consistently significant on
standard statistical grounds regardless of the choice of variables to repre-
sent accelerator considerations. Given some uncertainty about the
optimal choice of the latter variables, this research strategy clearly
provides a stronger test of the sign and importance of the finance and
risk variables of crucial interest to this paper than would results based
on estimates of a single equation combining them with only one of the•
several plausible and theoretically motivated accelerator-capacity vari-
ables. Using two of the apparently better and more interesting accelera-
tor-capacity variables, we also examined which representation of leverage
seemed to produce the best over-all results. At a later stage, each of six
variables representing real costs or profit margins in some form were
then added to the best sets of variables from previous runs in order to
determine the marginal effect of these further variables, but less systema-
tic study was given to these variables in view of the focus of the present
effort. Finally, since all the basic runs in the study were based on the
use of data available at the decision-making stage to forecast subsequent
investment outlays, some additional runs were made in the final stages
of our work that also included measures of the current (i.e., outlay)
quarter's conditions, which we hoped would pick up "surprises" and
the falsifications of earlier expectations associated with cancellations.
Apart from their own intrinsic interest, these runs provided a further
test of the inherent stability and importance of the finance and risk
considerations which are of primary concern to this study.
Although many of the input data were already in seasonally adjusted
form, seasonal dummies were included in all runs. Although very small
and uniformly insignificant (except for the second quarter), their con-
tinued inclusion represents an element of conservatism in the estimates
of corrected R2 and standard errors of estimate.31 As a general point of
reference, it may also be noted that the total contribution of the three
seasonal dummies to R2 ranged narrowly about .035. In addition, time
trends were included in all equations fitted in order to guard against
the possibility that some of the other variables included were merely
serving as proxies for excluded variables which were also associated
3'Sincetwo needless degrees of freedom (for the third and fourth quarters)
were allowed for in their calculation.Corporation Finance: Risk and Investment 237
with "time." The contribution of the time trend variable to R2 was
generally less than the total for the seasonal dummies. This clearly
reflected our earlier decision to estimate all equations in ratio form with
as the dependent variable.
Before proceeding to the presentation and discussion of our detailed
results, we should explain the symbols used and the measurement of the
variables included in the statistical work and tables.
SYMBOLS
represents the seasonally adjusted plant and equipment outlays of
manufacturing companies (S.E.C.-F.T.C. series), deflated by a price
index constructed as a 2—1 weighted average of the Department of Com-
merce implicit GNP deflators for producers' durable equipment and
nonresidential construction. indicates the value for the quarter fol-
lowing the reference date.
is a quarterly interpolation of Hickman's estimates of manufac-
turers' stocks of real capital in 1954 dollars. indicates the value at
the beginning of the reference quarter.
is an unweighted average of the Federal Reserve Board's Index of
Production for manufacturing over the three months in the indicated
quarter.
is de Leeuw's index of the utilization of manufacturing capacity
for the current quarter.
(CRc) represents capital requirements, 1.111 —1+where d is
the quarterly rate of (real) declining balance depreciation interpolated
from Hickman's annual estimates. The first two terms give the percent-
age change in capacity needed to bring capacity to its optimum relation
to present output (expressed as a percentage of present capacity) when
the optimum rate of operations is taken to be 90 per cent. This is the
measure of capital requirements used by de Leeuw in [4] without the
inclusion of an additional term to reflect the needs associated with
projected future growth.32
J is Jorgenson's ratio of the current price of output (P0) to the (cur-
rent dollar) user cost of capital services (c), which was computed
according to Jorgenson's formulas and procedures as given in [19] and
32Severalexperiments were run with "growth" included in a new CR variable;
but, with any of these "growth-CR" variables in the equation, the coefficient on the
growth component entered (in addition) as a separate variable was always strongly
negative. With the CR variable defined as in the text, outlays reflecting steady
expectations of growth will be reflected (with other things) in the constant term.
I had no luck formulating a variable which would pick up varying expectations of
growth.238 Financial Aspects
It should particularly be noted that the user cost factor (c) is a
function of the current quarter's effective income tax rate, and bookkeep-
ing depreciation, as well as the price level of capital goods, the interest
rate, and the debt-to-asset ratio. This I term was used as a multiplicative
form with the above three accelerator or capacity variables.34 If, for
instance, other things being equal, investment increases with capacity
utilization U, it is rational for the increment reflecting a favorable value
of I to be larger as utilization is higher, and vice versa. Similarly with
CR. Indeed, the product term J (CR) is especially attractive inasmuch
as it varies in the appropriate way the otherwise arbitrary assumption
(used in computing CR) that the optimal capacity provides for a 90 per
cent utilization ratio. In point of fact, the desired capital stock in rela-
tion to output will clearly be higher the more favorable the relation /
between output prices and user costs of capital. Finally, we note that
Jorgenson has shown [19] that desired capital stock K* will be propor-
tional (in my notation) to the product J 0, say K* =.aJO.If invest-
ment is equal to a fraction f3 of the discrepancy between K* and
the existing capital stock, we have=f3(aJO—K...1)or =
—1].This is the equation fitted in our work after rein-
terpreting the right side as inputs into the investment expenditures stream
(i.e., applying Almon weights to the terms on the right-hand side) and
allowing for the lag between decisions and initial outlays.
It should particularly be noted that Jorgenson's analysis was carried
through under the assumption of certainty. His demonstration that the
optimal capital stock is proportional to the product of I and an accelera-
tor term sugests that we may regard the effects that interest rates, taxes,
and leverage would have under certainty as being incorporated in such a
"compound accelerator" term in our equations. Any further effects of
interest rates and leverage variables, found when they are entered as
Ignoring capital gains (as he does), Jorgenson's formula for cis
/rl—uvlrl—uwl\ cq[I fr),
\Ll—uJL1—uJ/
whereu is the ratio of direct taxes paid to corporate profits before taxes, the cur-
rent quarter's effective tax rate; disthe declining balance depreciation rate; r is the
interest rate; v is the ratio of capital consumption allowances currently taken to
the current replacement cost of capital assets; and w is net monetary interest to
total capital cost. Since Jorgenson is working in a world of certainty, total capital
cost is the product of the interest rate •and total capital so that wreducesto the
debt-to-asset ratio; and current replacement cost is computed as the product dKq,
where q is the current price of capital goods.
EnteringI (or its reciprocal) linearly in the equation did not result in signifi-
cant coefficients, though the signs were generally appropriate.Corporation Finance: Risk and Investment 239
additional separate variables in the equation, can thus reasonably be
regarded as their impact upon risk under real world conditions of
uncertainty.
r is the interest rate variable, measured by the average of the monthly
Baa rates (Moody's) during the quarter, as given in the Federal Reserve
Bulletin. This rate waS used instead of the Aaa or long-term government
bond rate generally used by other investigators because it provides a
much better measure of the cost of funds to the average corporation.
The Baa rate, of course, reflects both the current level of the fully risk-
free rate and allowances for leaders' risk, but it reflects the costs to the
borrowers which they expect with assurance to discharge. The latter is
clearly the relevant matter for borrower's investment decisions, not the
fully risk-free rate itself.
is the trend in the Baa rate. This variable was measured by
a weighted average of past quarterly changes in the Baa rate, using
linearly declining weights for four quarters.35 With the Baa rate entered
separately in the equation, this variable reflects expectations of costs
of new funds and, in particular, it is an index of the difference between
the average costs and the incremental costs of new debt.
LTD is long-term debt, measured by all debt due in more than one
year to banks and other lenders, as shown in the F.T.C.-S.E.C. Quarterly
Financial Reports for manufacturing corporations.
RF represents retained funds, measured by net profits after taxes, less
cash dividends charged to surplus, plus depreciation and depletion.
NW is net worth, measured by total assets less total liabilities (cur-
rent liabilities, plus LTD plus other noncurrent liabilities). The F.T.C.-
S.E.C. reports do not segregate preferred stock, but this item is known
to have been sufficiently small and stable as to introduce little bias.
$K is capital stock expressed in current dollars, computed by reflating
Hickman's estimates of constant dollar capital stock by the price index
of the prices of capital goods (indicated underabove).
SP is the market value of equity indexed by twice the Standard and
Poor index of the market prices of 425 industrial securities (which is,
of course, adjusted for all stock splits and dividends). Ideally, it would
have been desirable to have made a further adjustment for net new issues,
but this did not prove feasible on a careful basis within the time avail-
able for the present study.
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The leverage variables used in the study were computed by forming
ratios with LTD and (LTD —RE),respectively, in the numerator and
using each of the variables NW, $K and SP in the denominator.
THE
Table 1 presents the regression coefficients, t-ratios, and partial cor-
relation indexes obtained when the following equation was fitted to the
data:
LTD—RE
=(SD)+ b1 + + b3 + b4r + b6 + b6T,
SP
(1)
where (SD) indicates three seasonal dummies, andrepresents the
particular "accelerator-capacity" variable (see list Table 1) which was
used. As previously indicated, in this and all other equations reported,
all explanatory variables (except, of course, the SD's and time) were
the weighted sums of past data cumulated to the period in question
using the Almon weights; also, all equations were fitted with all variables
in differenced form. Incidentally, it should be kept in mind that the
adjusted for degrees of freedom, which are given in the tables indi-
cate the fraction of the variance of the quarterly differences of
which are accounted for by the explanatory variables. If, instead, these
results are transformed into the corresponding fraction of the variance
of itself (without differencing) which is explained, the
would be given much higher values. For instance, a standard error of
estimate of .36 per cent implies an adjusted R62 of .935 on this alterna-
tive basis. Similarly, a o-(est) of .32 per cent corresponds to an of
.955, and a o-(est) of .30 per cent to an of .959.
In terms of the theoretical model developed in section II, the rationale
for the structure of equation (1) should be clear. Given any particular
accelerator-capacity variable to measure the volume of new investment
(as a percentage of existing capital stock) which would be undertaken
ceteris paribus if financing and risk considerations were neutral, the
other terms are included to measure the effects of the latter factors.
Specifically, the Baa rate (r) reflects the average cost of outstanding debt
at current bond prices, which serves as the base for judging the (before-
tax) cost of new debt and thus is one factor directly influencing the risk
of debt and the costs of funds. In addition to reflecting expectations of
36Theauthor is very grateful to George Schussel for his effective handling of all
the computer work involved in this study.242 Financial Aspects
rates, the trend in the Baa rate indexes the difference
between the marginal costs of debt and the average cost since it is a
rising linear function of the latter difference. (A negative value of
of course, does not necessarily imply that the marginal cash
cost of new borrowing is below the average cost of but
rather that this differential is smaller than at other times when the
interest-trend term has positive values.)
The theoretical analysis further showed that the difference between
the marginal cash costs of debt and its average cost is also an increasing
function of leverage. Our leverage variable is included in the equation
to reflect both these important effects.
The tests of the significance of these fund-cost and risk factors, in
conjunction with different choices of accelerator-capacity variables,
whicharereportedinTable1,utilizesleveragemeasured by
(LTD —RF)/SP because on a priori grounds this form of the leverage
variable was expected to best reflect and incorporate the different ele-
ments involved in the theoretical contthit of the leverage variable.
Specifically, the basic theoretical analysis showed that the marginal
(opportunity) costs of the use of debt and retained funds for investment
outlays should be the same. The underlying model of behavior thus
points directly to the use of LTD —RFrather than long-term debt
alone in the numerator of the leverage variable. Similarly, the whole
analysis is based on the fact that the relevant risks (and hence the
economic costs in the form of the minimum required expected returns)
depend fundamentally upon ex ante judgments of vectors looking into
the future of expected values of earnings and cash flows, together with
their stochastic properties, variances, and risks. Equity values reflect
both these critical matters, and do so with a directness and degree of
precision which is lacking in either book net worth or even the current
dollar value of the net fixed capital stock. A further reason for believing
that equity value is the superior and more relevant denominator in the
leverage variable is that the impediment to new investment posed by any
given stock of debt varies inversely with equity prices because of the
alternative of issuing new shares on more favorable terms as market
prices rise, and conversely.
Table 1 shows that, over these forty-four quarters of recent experience
in manufacturing, leverage is very strongly and negatively related to
investment, regardless of whether the output-capital stock ratio, de
Leeuw's capacity utilization index, or his "capital requirements" mea-
sure—or any of the three multiplied by Jorgenson's measure of the





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5Corporation Finance. Risk and Investment 245
capacity considerations in the equation. In all six equations, the nega-
tive leverage coefficient had a t-ratio of over 4.3, and the partial correla-
tion coefficients on the leverage variable ranged upward from .60. In
both respects, incidentally, the leverage variable actually "more
significant" than the accelerator-capacity variable in any of the equations.
The coefficients on the Baa rate and its trend-change were both nega-
tive in all six equations (in spite of the inclusion of "time" as a separate
variable). In the first three equations with "simple" accelerator-capacity
variables, the negative coefficients on the two interest rate variables all
had t-ratios of 1.45 or better, and one or the other showed a t of 3.0 or
more in each equation. It will be recalled that the interest rate is an
important component of Jorgenson's marginal productivity of the capital
term J used multiplicatively with the accelerators inthelast three equa-
tions. Perhaps this partially explains the generally less satisfactory per-
formance of the separate interest rate variables in these runs. It should
be noted, however, that the separate interest rate variables have t-ratios
of 2.1 and 3.0, respectively, when the product of I and (CR) is used to
measure investment needs and profitability.
Perhaps the most surprising result in the table is that the combination
of the marginal capital productivity term I with either or Ut
reduced the over-all R02's and D.W. statistics, as well as the t-ratios for
the individual variables in the equation. But the over-all results when the
product I is used are quite good and compare favorably with those
obtained when either capital requirements (CR) or a simple accelerator
is used in the equation. Each of these three accelerator vari-
ables leads to equations with standard errors of estimate of .32 per cent
and D.W. statistics of 1.7+ over the forty-four quarters of data.
Table 2 shows that in these data, when the equations are fitted using
the simple accelerator and both interest variables (and
"time"), the impact of leverage on investment is consistently negative
and "significant" according to the usual standards, regardless of which
of the six leverage variablesis chosen. The same conclusion holds
(Table 3) when the compound marginal productivity of capital cum
capital requirements term I (CR)is substituted for the simple accelera-
tor. And in both bases, both interest rate terms are consistently negative
and generally "significant" regardless of the leverage variable.
The use of the excess of long-term debt over retained funds in the
numerator of the leverage variable (rather than long-term debt itself)
generally led to higher t-ratios on the leverage term, and higher D.W.
statistics and lower estimating errors for the equation, as expected from
theoretical considerations. With both "accelerators," this was consistently246 Financial Aspects
the case when either book net worth or the market value of the equity
were used in the denominator of the leverage variable, although the
comparison is reversed when the current value of the stock of real
capital ($K) is used in the denominator.
As expected on theoretical grounds, the use of the market value of
the equity as the denominator of the leverage ratio led to uniformly
superior results to those obtained when either book net worth or the
current value of net real capital stock was used as the "base" of the
leverage measure. With both accelerators, and with LTD —RFas with
LTD alone in the numerator, the D.W. ratio and the t-ratio on the
leverage term was higher, and the estimating error of the equation was
lower, with SP than with NW or $K. While none of the differences
between individual pairs of regression coefficients using different numera-
tors or different denominators in the leverage variable was "statistically
significant," the over-all pattern and general consistency of the results,
togetherwiththeoreticalconsiderations,justifycontinueduseof
(LTD —RF)/SP as the preferred measure of the leverage variable.
Theoretical considerations also indicate that, under rational optimiz-
ing behavior, there will be significant interaction between the interest
rate and leverage variables. Higher interest rates mean that the risks
associated with any given degree of leverage are higher and also that
the incremental risk associated with any increment in leverage will be
greater. Similarly, higher leverage would in theory add to the deterrent
effects of any given level (or increase) in interest rates. Unfortunately,
it was not possible to get any meaningful measures of these incre-
mental interaction effects by simply adding the new product term
r[ (LTD —RF)/SP] to the earlier equations because of the collinearities
involved. As an alternative, the latter multiplicative form of compound
interest-rate and leverage variable was introduced in place of the interest
rate and leverage separately. As illustrated in Table 4, this procedure
did raise the precision of the estimate of the regression coefficient as
shown by the higher t-ratios, and this was true whether or not time was
included as a separate variable in the equation. Not only did the t-ratios
of the compound interest-leverage variable high values
of 6.6 and 7.0, but the smoothed rate of of the interest rate and
the accelerator terms both had t values pf 3.7 or better. These latter
(clearly very satisfactory) values were, however, sQmewhat lower than
those obtained when the interest rate and leverage were entered sepa-
rately in the equation; and the standard errors of estimate over the
observation period for the equations as a whole, and the values of the






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Altogether, this evidence provides little basis for the choice between
entering interest and leverage separately or as a single compound term.
In either case, the D.W. statistic is a very satisfactory 1.7; the standard
error of the equation is only about .31 per cent of the capital stock—or
less than $250,000 of investment outlay at annual rates on the average
in 1954 dollars—and the error of forecasts of investment for the second
and third quarters of 1964 were consistent with this (percentage) figure.
Although these investigations were focused primarily upon the effects
of financial and risk considerations (with accelerator effects) on invest-
ment outlays, we should also briefly note the results of including other
terms in the equations presented to pick up the independent effect of
certain factors reflecting relative real costs and profit margins, both as
current data and (by changes or trends of changes) as elements of
expectations. The comments can properly be brief because, whatever
significance for future research our results may have, the findings were
negative. Specifically, none of the separate variables for profit margins
(either on sales or net worth) or their first differences or trends, the
ratio of product price to labor cost or its first difference or trend, or the
ratio of labor to real capital cost proved to be significant when added
as an additional variable to our basic equations.37 In each case, the
addition of the term produced a t-ratio of less than 1.2 on the variable
and failed to improve the over-all equation. The same negative results
were also obtained when stock price, equity earnings yields, or retained
funds were added as separate variables (except that retained funds
always had a positive sign and were often "significant" as a sepa-
rate variableif LTD rather than the theoretically preferred form
(LTD —RF)was used in the leverage variable). In the same way
(perhaps because of our use of the Almon weights on past values of
all explanatory variables), the addition of either the first differences
or the smoothed rate of change of any of the accelerator variables
shown in Table 1 'frequently produced "wrong" signs on these terms
and no "significant" and "right" signs on these added variables in any
of the equations tested. Neither did the orders-capacity variable, which
has been suggested by Hart [15], prove to be a significant additional
variable in our equations—a finding that may be due to our use of data
for all manufacturing (rather than the durable sector separately) or to
the period since 1953 when supply bottlenecks were of less importance
than they had been in earlier years.
This did not merely reflect the order in which the variables were introduced.
In several tests, these variables were put in early and "fell out" as financial-risk
variables were added.Corporation Finance: Risk and Investment 249
Finally, it should be recalled that all of our basic runs and tests were
undertaken with a view to explaining investment outlays in terms of the
fundamental determinants of the decisions to make real investments. To
this end, in view of the spreading of the actual resulting expenditures
over time, all explanatory variables consisted of data which had been
cumulated to the given index quarter using Almon's weights (and the
explanatory data cumulated to the ttht period were used to determine
investment in the (t + 1) th quarter to allow for the so-called "decision
lag"). But not all decisions or initial commitments result in final expen-
ditures on a fixed time schedule without- speed-up, deferral, or cancella-
tion. This is clearly established by studies of the "realization function"
relating appropriations to actual subsequent outlays and also by studies
of the differences between the expenditures planned for future quarters,
as reported in S.E.C. surveys, and the actual amounts later expended
(see, e.g., [34] and [12]).
In the final stages of our work, consequently, some additional runs
were niade that also included a measure of current conditions in the
tth quarter, which we hoped would pick up cancellations and other posi-
tive and negative effects of "surprises" on the actual investment outlays
in the (t + 1 )th quarter. Since previous studies have found that the
discrepancy between actual and "expected" salesis the factor most
closely related to differences between actual and expected investment
outlays, the variable used was the percentage difference between actual
output and "expected" output in the tv" quarter. ("Expected" output
was estimated by the exponentially smoothed value of the stream of past
quarterly outputs with a smoothing constant of .1). For the results see
Table 5.
This "surprise" or "sales discrepancy" variable proved to be positive
and significant with a t-ratio of 2.37 or better. The statistical results over
the observation period were improved. The D.W. statistic was raised to
over 1.9, and the standard error of estimate of was reduced to
.30 per cent or less. The forecasting errors for '64 :2and'64werealso
somewhat improved by the addition of this "surprise" term. Most rele-
vant to the basic concerns of the present paper, however, is that the
addition of the current sales "surprise" variable produced little change
in the regression coefficients of the leverage variables (LTD —RF)/SP
or r[(LTD —RF)/SP]and that their t-ratios remained high (4.6 or
more for the former, and 5.6 or more for the latter). The addition of the
surprise term raised the t-ratio on the Baa rate as a separate variable to
more than 3.0 when a time trend term was not included in the equation;
with "time" included separately, the coefficient on the Baa rate was still250 Financial Aspects
negative and "significant" at about the .1 level. The addition of the sales
surprise term reduced the t-ratios on the smoothed rate of change of the
Baa rate, but its t-ratios still remained above 2.15. It will also be noted
that the addition of the tth periods sales surprise raised the precision of
the estimate of the coefficient on the basic accelerator variable
which is cumulated with the Almon weights.
In view of Hickman's [16] earlier finding of negative time trends in
investment equations, which appeared to imply a gradual weakening of
investment demand due to technical progress, attention should also be
called to the fact that all the time trends in our equations are essentially
zero or positive. The models fitted here include financial and risk vari-
ables, while no such terms were included in his equations. Our results
consequently suggest that the negative time trends he obtained probably
reflect the powerful effects of these other factors upon which we have
focused rather than any persistent marginal depressing effect of tech-
nological change. In particular, they suggest that the ratio of new invest-
ment to capital stock will be maintained if output is kept strong in rela-
tion to real capital stock and finance-risk factors are held neutral.
JV. General Conclusions
As developed in section II, the neo-Fisherian model of purely competi-
tive security markets of risky bonds and stocks traded by risk-averse
investors leads directly to a unified theory of rational corporate finan-
cial and investment policy, under the traditional assumption that man-
agement's objective is to maximize the market value of the equity of its
shareholders. In this theory, as in Fisher's earlier model under certainty,
both financial and accelerator or capital-requirements variables are
required by the optimizing economic theory itself in the specification of
the statistical model intended to represent the structure of investment
decisions and behavior. In keeping with this theory, the present paper
has sought to throw light on the simultaneous influence of both sets of
considerations upon investment behavior. Rather than undertaking a
race (or alternative choice test) between allegedly competing subtheories
of investment, the statistical work has sought to test and implement the
unified structure suggested by the theory.
Since the empirical work was confined to data for all manufacturing
for the eleven years 1953—63, with limited forecasts beyond that period,
the econometric results are not conclusive at this stage. Further work
with individual industries, longer forecast periods, different time spans,












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































desirability of further work along these lines, since the quarterly data
for all manufacturing over this decade do quite consistently bear out
the expectations of the theory.
En terms of these data, the most important finding is the fact that
leverage (and one or more interest variables) were highly significant
and negatively related to investment outlays. This was consistently true
with different accelerator-capacity variables in the equation; with long-
term debt alone, or its excess over retained funds, used in the numerator
of the leverage variable; and with either numerator used with any of
three denominators in the leverage variable. As suggested by the theory,
the ratio (LTD —RF)/SP seemed to be clearly superior to the other
leverage variables regardless of the accelerator-capacity component of
the equation. No strong basis was found for choosing between entering
the interest rate and leverage-retained earning variable separately in the
equation or using one variable which is a multiplicative combination
of them, although the t-ratios on the latter leverage variable were higher
(5.6+). The smoothed rate of change of the Baa rate remained highly
significant and negative regardless of the form of the leverage variable
and regardless of whether the level of the Baa rate was entered sepa-
rately or as part of a compound interest-leverage term.
All explanatory variables were cumulated to the index quarter, using
Almon's weights to allow for the distributed lag of investment outlays
after decisions and appropriations. We also found that all explanatory
variables in these basic equations retained their significance and were
in general little changed by the addition of a current (i.e., noncumu-
lated) actual-to-expected sales-discrepancy term to measure cancella-
tions and other positive and negative effects of "surprises" (see Table 5).
With this additional term, the Durbin-Watson statistics were 1.9+, and
standard errors of estimate were under .30 per cent of which
is the equivalent of an adjusted R02 on investment itself of .96÷. Time
trend terms were nonnegative in all equations incorporating finance and
leverage terms and were virtually zero in the final equations presented.
In one important respect, the results did not conform to those
expected on the basis of theory: like other investigators, we failed to
find significant effects and coefficients for any of several relative real
cost variables tested as separate variables added to the equation.
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COMMENT
ON MILLER-MODIGLIANI AND LINTNER
BY J. FRED WESTON
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES
The Miller and Modigliani paper is a curious combination of impres-
sive formal analysis resting on inconsistent and mutually contradictory
premises. Drawing on their earlier work, they make assumptions and
define terms so that they may conclude that financial policy does not
affect the firm's cost of capital under certainty and with no income taxes.
With income taxes, a subsidy is provided to debt. The consequence
would be that firms would use the maximum amount of debt. But the
observed facts indicate that this is obviously not true.
Miller and Modigliani resort to the concept of a "target debt ratio,"
denoted as L, to explain why observed debt ratios are not as high as
their model implies. A target debt ratio implies some policy on financing
mix by a firm. But this is precisely what traditional business finance has
argued and what Miller and Modigliani have denied. Their reference
to "the maximum permitted by lenders" is an imprecise way of saying
that the cost of debt at some point rises sharply with increased leverage
—implying an optimal debt-to-equity ratio.
The theoretical underpinnings of their empirical materials are there-
fore confused. Their development of the theoretical model is marred by
loose statements and unsupported assertions such as the following: "For
companies with reasonable access to the capital markets, as would cer-
tainly be true of those in our sample, investment and financing decisions
(including decisions to retire outstanding securities)are made con-
tinuously and largely independently over time."
What does "reasonable access to the capital markets" signify in
analytical terms? What is their evidence that investment and financing
decisions are made "continuously and largely independently over time"?
Surely such critical assertions should not be made without evidence or
reference to other studies which provide evidence.
After an extended discussion of theoretical models, the equation
which they use in their statistical tests turns out to be a rough empirical
approach. The value of the firm is related to the factors generally con-
sidered important in the business finance literature. These factors include
earnings, dividend policy, growth rate, leverage, and size of firms. Their256 Financial Aspects
results, then, critically depend on how the variables are measured and
the nature of their sample.
The Miller-Modigliani study is focused on the electric utility industry.
A number of characteristics of the regulated industry can influence the
generality of their results and even interpretation of their significance
for the electric utility industry. First, if the earnings of a utility company
exceed or fall below some range, a rate adjustment may take place.
Second, a review of the opinions of utility commissions indicates a
preference for investment financed from outside equity compared with
retained earnings. This attitude certainly influences dividend policy.
Third, the effect of regulation is to create a tendency toward uniformity
in both leverage and dividend policies. For example, if higher debt
ratios lead to higher earnings, the higher profits may be reduced by
rate adjustments. On the other hand, if earnings are low because lever-
age ratios are low, commissions are unlikely to make compensatory rate
adjustments. The influence of regulation is to make for conformity in
financial policies—a consequence which should greatly influence the
interpretation of the empirical results.
In this connection, the empirical measurements of Lintner present
another set of problems. Lintner studies the plant and equipment out-
lays of all U.S. manufacturing corporations over the forty-four quarters
of 1953—63. The Miler-Modigliani studies focus on cross-section analy-
sis of an industry for which product homogeneity is emphasized. Lintner
employs a time series analysis covering a wide variety of industries. This
substantially departs from the Miller-Modigliani concept of industries
representing homogeneous risk classes.
It is interesting to note that the underlying theoretical models differ
as well. Miller and Modigliani seek to explain the value of the firm,
while Lintner seeks to explain investment outlays. He emphasizes that
financing decisions and investment decisions are mutually determined.
This strong belief is in direct contrast with the counter assertion of
Miller and Modigliani.
Lintner argues that the marginal cost of financing is represented by
the marginal cost of debt. He suggests that the marginal cost of debt is
likely to rise exponentially for a number of reasons. But since the equity
holders are in a junior position to the creditors of a company, the factors
that cause the cost of debt function to rise sharply are likely to cause
the cost of equity function to rise even more.
Lintner objects to the use of the weighted average method of calcu-
lating the cost of capital. In theory the marginal cost of capital should
be measured as we measure the marginal cost of any inputs. We formu-Comment 257
late a function and take the partial derivatives with respect to the inputs
being varied. Lintner argues that the weighted average cost method of
calculating the cost of capital is wrong because the average cost is used
rather than the marginal cost of debt and equity financing. But this
objection can be met conceptually by using the marginal costs rather
than the average costs.
Lintner's objection to the use of weighting appears to confuse (1)
increasing the size of the capital budget by the use of debt or equity and
(2) changing the debt-equity mix. This goes to the heart of the difficulty
in calculating the cost of financial inputs. For calculating the marginal
cost of physical (real) labor and capital inputs, the points of tangency
of the isoproduct and isocost lines for different levels of output are con-
nected. The isoquants representing different levels of value of the firm
for different combinations of debt and equity unfortunately involve
interdependence. To change the debt-to-equity mix not only
influencesthe cost of equity as well. Altering the
financing mix changes both the earnings of the company and the appro-
priate capitalization rates to be employed. The theoretical problem is
formidable and the measurement problem appears to require some
approximation methods for working purposes.
Lintner asserts that the opportunity cost of using more retained funds
to increase the current size of the capital budget is the foregone oppor-
tunity to repay debt, "as Duesenberry has emphasized." Neither Duesen-
berry nor Lintner provides evidence that the opportunity cost of increas-
ing the size of the capital budget is the foregone opportunity to repay
debt. Why is not retirement of equity another alternative use of retained
funds? Would not the decision to retire debt or to retire equity be a
function of the marginal decreases in the cost of funds resulting from
applying retained earnings in the one direction or the other?
Particularly in the latter section of the paper where Lintner is formu-
lating statements about the behavior of the cost of capital function, it
would be useful to have the arguments presented in a more precise
analytical framework. Without a clear statement of the complete model
that is being used, it is not certain what the linkage is between the data
and model, between measurement procedures and the meaning of the
results.
ON MILLER-MODIGLIANI
BY IRWIN FRIEND, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
The most interesting part of the paper by Miller and Modigliani con-
sists of an econometric implementation of their basic model of firm258 Financial Aspects
valuation and cost of capital, which is applied to cross-section data for
electric utilities in 1954, 1956, and 1957. This model assumes that the
cost of capital for a firm in a given risk class is, apart from the very
important tax complication (for which they adjust explicitly), invariant
to capital structure.
Their theory leads to a basic structural equation in which the value of
the firm, apart from tax (and size of firm) effects, is determined by two
terms.' The first is the capitalization of current earnings before interest,
represented as the product of such earnings (which can be measured
directly) and the reciprocal of the cost of equity capital,2 which cannot
be measured directly but is assumed to be a constant for all firms of
given size in the industry. The second term is the value placed on the
growth potential, expressed empirically as the product of expected
growth in the book value of assets (based on the most recent five-year
-growth rate) and another "constant," which in theory is an inverse
function of the cost of capital and a direct function of the rate of return
on new investment and of the duration of the period for which profitable
new investment opportunities are expected to persist. The cost of financ-
ing for an all-equity structure, which is different from the total cost of
financing in the Miller-Modigliani model only as a result of the tax
savings associated with debt, is estimated as the reciprocal of the regres-
sion coefficient of the current earnings variable in this structural equation.
My reaction to such an approach to estimation of the cost of financing
is that, while it is intriguing, it is also questionable. If the measure of
expected growth is a poor one, the current earnings variable (expressed
as a ratio of the book value of assets) may act as a proxy for such
growth so that its coefficient is biased upward and hence the estimated
cost of capital would be biased downward. More important, there is a
much more direct approach to the estimation of the cost of capital which
avoids both this statistical difficulty and the theoretical necessity of
assuming the irrelevance of capital structure, apart from tax savings, to
over-all valuation and cost of financing of the firm.3 This alternative
approach, which appears preferable both on statistical and theoretical
grounds, consists of' estimating the cost of equity (which is no longer
the cost for a pure equity stream) as the sum of a dividend yield plus an
estimated growth rate in earnings and dividends, and obtaining the
1Forstatistical reasons, all variables are divided by the book value of assetsin
the equations actually fitted.
2Thisis the cost of capital for an all-equity structure in that risk class.
The Miler-Modigliani approach permits the incorporation of leverage variables
into their basic structural equation, but this may aggravate the statistical difficul-
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over-all cost of capital as the market-value weighted sum of the costs
of equity and senior capital (adjusted for tax effects). There are, of
course, major problems involved in estimating the expected growth
rate—including decisions on the use of the past objective record, fore-
casts used by financial analysts, the duration of the period for which
growth is to be projected, etc.—but these same problems exist in the
implementation of the Miller-Modigliani econometric model. I (as well
as others) have used this approach in the past, and it is my impression
that it would yield significantly higher estimates of the cost of capital for
the electric utilities than the Miler-Modigliani figures ranging from
3.6 per cent in 1954 to 4.6 per cent in 1957, which seem to me to be
implausibly low (and indeed are not much higher than the yield on AAA
public utility bonds).
In estimating the regressions coefficients in their basic structural
equation, Miller and Modigliani substitute normalized earnings for
reported earnings in order to eliminate measurement errors from the
key earnings variable in the equation. Their method of normalizing
earnings is to regress reported earnings on five different variables includ-
ing dividends, with normalized earnings measured as the expected value
of the dependent variable in this regression. Of the variables tested, the
unabridged version of their paper seems to indicate that only dividends
exert a major influence on normalized earnings, though one other vari-
able—strangely enough, the ratio of preferred stock to assets—was also
significant. It is not clear in their analysis that dividends alone would
not have sufficed as a proxy for normalized earnings. The authors do
not discuss other alternatives which have been used for normalizing
earnings, some of which seem preferable to me.4 Actually, the change
in the coefficients of the earnings variable in their basic structural equa-
tion, as a result of the substitution of normalized for reported earnings,
does not appear to be very large. The only noteworthy difference
between the normalized and reported earnings coefficients is that the
former imply an increase in the cost of capital from 1954 to 1956 and
1957 in both regressions fitted, i.e., with and without a constant term,
while the latter yield almost the identical results in the regression without
a constant term but point to a decrease in the cost of capital in the
regression with a constant term (which is the regression the authors like
least). Intuitively, in spite of an increase in interest rates, stability or
even some decrease in the cost of capital over this period does not seem
For example, see Irwin Friend and Marshall Packett, "Dividends and Stock
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implausible to me in view of the reasons for believing there was a reduc-
tion in the required risk differential on
Though they devote considerable attention to the rise in their estimates
of the cost of capital from 1954 to 1957, I do not really understand the
explanation of this phenomenon offered by Miller and Modigliani. The
average cost of capital according to them rises from 3.6 to 4.6 per cent,
while the yields on AAA public utility bonds rise from 3.1 to 4.3 per
cent. Disregarding what I consider to be an unreasonably low figure for
the cost of capital at the beginning of this period, the Miller-Modigliani
estimates appear to imply that there was no lowering of the risk dif-
ferential on equity over this period—a result which, to me at least,
seems dubious.
In view of these and other reservations (including a feeling that the
authors have been less than charitable in their references to the state of
the arts), my over-all reaction to the paper is that it is a stimulating but
unsuccessful attempt to measure an elusive but highly important eco-
nomic parameter, the cost of capital. As the authors point out, the goal
is extremely important and difficult of attainment. It is no reflection on
the ingenuity displayed in this paper to suggest that the goal has yet to
be attained.
REPLY TO FRIEND AND WESTON
BY MILLER AND MODIGLIANI
We are grateful to Friend for pointing out so specifically, succinctly,
and frankly those aspects of our approach to measuring the cost of capi-
tal about which he has serious misgivings. It is apparent that his objec-
tions spring largely from his qualms about our actual numerical estimates
of the cost of capital, which strike him as implausibly low and as moving
over time in the wrong direction. These qualms, quite understandably,
have led him to search for possible shortcomings in our procedures that
might be responsible for estimates seemingly so wide of the mark. In
Similarly, in the authors' unabridged version of their paper, which incorporates
dividend policy as an additional explanatory variable in their basic structural equa-
tion, I do not understand the authors' preference for two-stage or normalized
results vs. direct least-squares results.In the latter, dividend policy is significant
in 1954, with higher payout associated with higher market value, but not at all in
1956 and 1957, while in the former the payout ratio is not significantly related to
market value in any year, but there is an upward drift in its impact on market
value over this period. Intuitively again, the direct least-squares results (including
the other regression coefficients in the equation) seem fully as plausible as the
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what follows we shall try to indicate why we do not share his doubts
and why we persist in believing that our estimates, properly interpreted,
are plausible and sensible. Before doing so, however, it may be useful
first to consider his methodological objections.
As one possible reason for the low estimates he points out that "the
current earnings variable ... mayact as a proxy for [expected] growth
and hence the estimated cost of capital would be biased downward."
We have acknowledged in our paper that our measure of expected
growth opportunities is only an approximation and that, to the extent
that it is measured subject to error, biases in the other coefficients may
well creep in. But we have some grounds at least for believing that any
likely bias from the correlation between earnings and growth in the
present case could hardly be large enough to change the picture dramat-
ically. Not only is there no particular reason to expect a priori any
systematic correlation between the level of current earnings (relative to
assets) and future growth potential in a regulated industry such as this
one, but the data themselves give no hint of such correlation. The simple
correlations between earnings and our growth variable (see Appendix B,
Table 2, of the unabridged version) are virtually zero or negligibly
negative in all three years. Granted that our measure of growth is far
from perfect, and hence that we cannot be absolutely sure that there is
no correlation between earnings and the true measure, our measure of
growth cannot really be so bad (judging by how well it does perform in
the valuation regressions) that it would fail to pick up any correlation
between growth and earnings strong enough to have a noticeable effect
on the results.
Friend's second possible explanation of the peculiar results is that we
have used a "questionable" and certainly too roundabout method of
estimation in preference to a "much more direct" method of estimating
the cost of capital. By direct, he means first estimating the cost of equity
capital as the sum of an estimate of the expected dividend yield and
some estimate of the expected growth rate of dividends or earnings, and
then obtaining the over-all cost of capital as a weighted average of this
cost of equity, current debt, and preferred stock yields (adjusted for
tax effects). In his view, this approach is superior to ours "both on
statistical and theoretical grounds." It is also his impression (based on
his own work and that of others) that his method "would yield signifi-
cantly higher estimates of the cost of capital for the electric utilities."
This is, indeed, a major point of contention, since we would have
regarded as one of the major methodological contributions of our paper
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piecemeal approach to the cost of capital that Friend describes and
recommends.
By "preferable on theoretical grounds," he means, apparently, that his
approach "avoids the theoretical necessity of assuming the irrelevance
of capital structure, apart from tax savings, to the over-all valuation of
the firm." It is true, of course, that our estimates were computed on that
assumption and that such an assumption is also implied in our model
of rational valuation. But this has nothing to do with our method of esti-
mation. Before discussing results based on the assumption, we first
tested that assumption and found that it was indeed consistent with the
data in our (see Table 4 of the unabridged version). If these
tests had turned out differently, so would the final results we presented.
It is also true, of course, that his "direct" method avoids the necessity
of considering explicitly the relation between capital structure and valua-
tion. But it does so only at the cost of having a less useful and less
informative result. At best, his approach will provide an estimate of a
single point on the cost of capital function, namely, the point corre-
sponding to the actual current sample value of the capital structure
(and the current levels of any other variables that affect valuation).
Hence, in contrast to our approach, the results of the piecemeal
approach cannot be used for policy-making or policy evaluation pur-
poses by individual firms or regulatory bodies.
Even more puzzling is Friend's claim that his method is "statistically
superior." He certainly cannot mean by this that his concept of growth
is a simpler one than ours or that it presents fewer problems to the esti-
mator. Indeed, the opposite is closer to the truth. His growth compo-
nent, after all, is nothing more or less than the expected capital gain on
a share of common stock, and this expectation must reflect not only
growth in our sense (i.e., of advantageous future investment opportuni-
ties) but also expected financial policy (i.e., the extent to which future
asset expansion will be financed from retained earnings). If, neverthe-
less, Friend stifi feels more comfortable with his approach to growth
rather than with ours, that is, of course, his privilege; but other investi-
gators should at least not be misled into thinking that his approach
offers any clear-cut advantage over ours.
As to whether the Friend method, properly implemented, will indeed
turn out to yield substantially higher estimates than ours, that is any-
body's guess. We have our doubts since we do not really think our
estimates are unreasonably low for reasons to be indicated later. In any
event, we too, in another connection, happen to have made some com-
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number of companies, including some also in our utility sample. It was
not our experience that such yields, after correction for leverage, were
substantially and systematically higher than the pure equity yields
implied by the results in the present paper. We wonder whether Friend
may not have derived his impression that equity yields in this period
were quite high from the reported figures on realized yields or rates of
return. These ex post yields were indeed rather high on the whole; but
since they contain a very substantial amount of what must surely be
regarded as unanticipated capital appreciation, they are hardly likely to
be good measures of the kind of ex ante or required yields that he and
we are concerned with.1
Friend's third methodological objection is that we have based our
main conclusions on one particular set of test results involving a very
special "method of normalizing earnings," i.e., our two-stage, instru-
mental variable approach to estimation. On this point, a casual reader of
his comments is likely to come away with the impression that our use
of the two-stage estimates is simply a peculiar matter of taste on our
part. We seem to prefer two-stage estimates with constant suppressed
to direct least-squares estimates with or without constant. He, on the
other hand, would prefer our direct least-squares estimates and would
presumably be even happier with estimates derived from another
"normalizing" approach developed by him and Marshall Puckett.
Actually, of course, we base our discussion of the cost of capital on
the estimates without a constant term not because we enjoy suppressing
constants or feel that those estimates are more in line with our prejudices
but because the basic theoretical specification requires the constant to
be so treated and because the tests of that specification presented in our
paper give no evidence that the constant term is other than zero. We
used a two-stage instrumental variable approach because, under our
assumptions, such estimates would at least have the property of con-
sistency whereas the direct least-squares estimates are open to bias from
measurement errors in the key earnings variable (and particularly so if a
constant term were to be included). It is for the same reason, of course,
that we "preferred" our approach to the alternative method of Friend
and Puckett. Ingenious as their method may be, it cannot be expected
to yield consistent estimates, as they themselves have acknowledged.2
1Oursuspicions about the unanticipated nature of much of the realized capital
gains over this period are strongly reinforced by the findings of F. Ardetti in his
as yet unpublished dissertation, "Risk and The Required Return on Equity,"
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965, esp. Chapter IV.
2Friend and M. Puckett, "Dividends and Stock Prices," American Economic
Review, September 1964, p. 669.264 Financial Aspects
In any event, anticipating that our instrumental variable procedure
might be unfamiliar to some and might cause just such uneasiness as
Friend has shown, we took the precaution of providing some alternative
"calibrating" estimates derived from a more conventional method. This
approach, which represents what we called the "yield formulation," does
rely on familiar direct least-squares estimation. It can be expected to be
free at least from bias stemming from the measurement error in earn-
ings, though subject to certain other sources of bias that should tend on
balance to underestimate the cost of capital. Comparison of the estimates
derived from these very different procedures (see Table 6 and surround-
ing text in the unabridged version) shows that they are quite close and
stand in the predicted relation to each other. If, therefore, our two-stage
estimates are "implausibly low," this cannot be attributed to any serious
distortions introduced through our "normalization" procedure
Havingfailed to find anything in Friend's methodological objections
that could account for the "implausibility" of the estimates, a few words
may now be in order in defense of their reasonableness. We suspect that
some of Friend's misgivings stem from his concentration on our esti-
mates of the so-called weighted average cost of capital or tax-adjusted
required rates of return given in Table 4. The tax-adjusted rate is a
measure about which it is difficult to make intuitive judgments because
the concept of income on which it is based does not correspond to any
of the more commonly used accounting concepts. Furthermore, because
of the way we controlled for size of firm, the estimates presented apply
directly only to the largest firms (strictly speaking, to firms of infinite
size).Adjusting to average size our estimates of the tax-adjusted
required rates of return for 1956 and 1957 come to 4.6 and 4.8 per cent,
respectively. If we next convert from a tax-adjusted to the more familiar
before-tax basis, these estimates imply before-tax required rates of
return for companies of average size in this industry of 9.5 and 10 per
cent, respectively. Such values certainly do not strike us as being pre-
posterously low.
Nor isit meaningful to compare, as Friend does, our tax-adjusted
average rate with the before-tax bond yield since our required rate is so
substantially affected by the sizable tax subsidy on the very high degree
of leverage that is found in this industry. The more sensible comparison,
There is equally little ground for Friend's concern over the fact that, in the
first-stage regressions on the instrumental variables, the dividend variable alone
seems to account for most of the correlation. As we pointed out in the unabridged
version, virtually identical estimates (though, of course, with somewhat higher
standard errors) are obtained when dividends are not included among the instru-
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if one is to be made, would be between the bond yield and our estimated
cost of equity capital or tax-adjusted required return for an unlevered
firm. The latter figure, again adjusting for size, we find to be 5.3 per
cent in 1954, compared with a bond yield of 3.1 per cent, implying a
"risk premium" of some 70 per cent. By 1957, the required equity yield
had risen to 6.4 per cent, compared with a bond yield of 4.3 per cent,
implying a risk premium of just below 50 per cent. Premiums of this
size do not strike us as unreasonably low for an industry like the electric
utilities consisting of regulated but protected monopolies, none of which
suffered any losses (or even sizable declines in earnings) either during
the sample period or for several prior years, despite the fact that some
of these were years of recession. Note also that our estimates, properly
interpreted, do seem to indicate a falling trend in the risk premium of
the kind that Friend's intuition led him to suspect. If anything, this fall
in the "risk differential on equity" strikes us as rather remarkably large
for the period 1954-57. For, though we share his feeling that a sub-
stantial downward adjustment in risk premiums probably took place
between the late 1940's and the middle 1950's (reflecting the growing
confidence in the economy's resistance to severe depression), our guess
would have been that more of the adjustment had occurred before the
end of 1954.
There are still other ways to put our estimates in a more meaningful
perspective from which to bring intuition to bear. For example, starting
from our 1957 estimate of the average tax-adjusted cost of capital, one
finds that after adjusting for average size of firm and average leverage
the required rate of return or yield on levered common stock implied by
our results is on the order of 8.5 per cent, which, again, hardly seems
preposterously low.4 As a further and particularly telling consideration
suggesting that our estimates of the tax-adjusted cost of capital are not
substantially too low, we may point out that the convenional 6 per cent
return after taxes on the rate base is equivalent to about 5.2 per cent
when converted to our tax-adjusted basis (see section III of our paper).
Since there seems to be clear and undisputed evidence that investors
during this period were willing to pay significant premiums for growth
potential,' they must presumably have been projecting a tax-adjusted
cost of capital or required yield that was less than 5.2 per cent. With an
implied ceiling of this order of magnitude, our estimates of 4.6 and 4.8
per cent as the required yields in 1956 and 1957 can hardly be con-
Curiously enough, our implied yields on levered equity shares of utilities in this
period are actually somewhat higher than those reported by Professor Friend in his
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sidered as implausibly low. On the contrary, we suggest that it will be
the Friend estimates, if they turn out to be very substantially above ours,
that will have to be regarded as implausibly high!
Summing up, then, we can find no basis for Friend's repeated asser-
tions that our estimates of the tax-adjusted cost of capital for the utility
industry are far too low. And since we certainly respect his judgment in
matters pertaining to the capital markets, we are led to suspect that he
did not dig deeply enough into our perhaps overlong paper to appreciate
what our estimates really mean or how they relate to other, more
familiar concepts of yield.
Turning now briefly to Weston's critical remarks it should be noted
that, with one exception to be discussed below, his comments really have
little bearing on the problem of main concern in this paper, namely,
how to estimate the cost of capital. His quarrel is rather with the
presumed "theoretical underpinning" of our model of valuation. Since
these underpinnings have been discussed at length in several of our
previous papers and will be further explored in sequels to the present
paper, there is no point in rehashing the matter here. Sufficeit to
say, for the sake of the record, that we do not agree that our target
leverage ratio is the same as the optimum financing mix of traditional
discussions of finance—an optimum such that deviations in either direc-
tion would adversely affect the value of the shares. As for his strictures
on our failure to present any direct evidence for our working assump-
tions of rational behavior and perfect capital markets, we were frankly
astonished to see this sort of ploy in what purports to be a serious
critique. We would have thought it had long been accepted among
economists that standard working assumptions of this kind can only be
effectively tested by testing their consequences. And that, of course, is
precisely what most of our paper is about! We also feel that his com-
ments on this matter come with particular ill grace since he has inter-
larded his own remarks with a number of dubious, unsupported asser-
tions about electric utilities—assertions much more susceptible to direct
check than our working assumptions.
Weston's one substantive point is that external regulation of earnings
and financial policies in the electric utility industry may reduce the
"generality" and "significance" of our results, particularly those bearing
on the relation between financial policy and the cost of capital. There
are really two distinct kinds of questions involved here. First, does the
mere fact that the financial policies may have been imposed on the man-
agements of some firms create problems of estimation or interpretation?
Here the answer is clearly no.. Our concern is solely with what investorsComment 267
are willing to pay for the different packages of earnings and financial
policy that actually do come onto the market for sale. For establishing
the empirical relations between the prices of various packages, the
questions of why they differ or who really makes them up are wholly
irrelevant. On the other hand, a serious estimation problem might arise
if regulation of financial policy was so pervasive and so uniform that all
the packages on the market were virtually alike. When we first began
the study, this was indeed our greatest fear about the sample. As it
turns out, however, there does happen to be considerable variation
within the industry—less so certainly than we would like, but enough
to rule out the possibility that our zeroish results for debt and dividend
policy reflect merely a fit to a single point with some random variation in
its immediate neighborhood. Weston could have discovered this himself
either by looking at the table of means and standard deviations of the
variables presented in the appendix of the unabridged version, or by
looking at the results of the direct least-squares regressions where there
was apparently enough variability, in some years at least, for the finan-
cial policy variables to show up as highly significant and in the classical
direction. All this is not to say, of course, that we regard our assump-
tions, procedures, or results as unexceptionable; but we do think such
severe critics should present us at least. with a bill of particulars.